tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post109998724435956413..comments2024-03-08T04:09:09.836-06:00Comments on Mixing Memory: Idioms, Metaphors, and Lakoff, Oh My!Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08417970139690159046noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1140802339487214212006-02-24T11:32:00.000-06:002006-02-24T11:32:00.000-06:00This is probably a naïve question, but I hope some...This is probably a naïve question, but I hope someone could explain why the reading time measures are so fundamental? If mappings (or projections)are as important as Lakoff suggests, why should it take longer to read them? (Isn't this just an instantiation of the 'metaphors are literary devices' assumption?). <BR/><BR/>Besides, if the same sentence is read several times in one setting, isn't it strange that participants did not read it quicker after a few exposures (regardless of mapping or not)?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1123462974105801822005-08-07T20:02:00.001-05:002005-08-07T20:02:00.001-05:00Anon, I agree. In fact, I've conducted research on...Anon, I agree. In fact, I've conducted research on that very hypothesis: that what happens after repeated mappings is that their outputs, including the patterns of inference, become schemas themselves, and can be contextually activated. However, this is nothing like the claims of Lakoff and Johnson. For them, the base concept is activated, not simply the output of the mappings. Otherwise, the concepts are not metaphorical, but have metaphorical origins (i.e., lakoff and johnson are doing linguistic archeology, like I always say).Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08417970139690159046noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1123462973626278012005-08-07T20:02:00.000-05:002005-08-07T20:02:00.000-05:00Anon, I agree. In fact, I've conducted research on...Anon, I agree. In fact, I've conducted research on that very hypothesis: that what happens after repeated mappings is that their outputs, including the patterns of inference, become schemas themselves, and can be contextually activated. However, this is nothing like the claims of Lakoff and Johnson. For them, the base concept is activated, not simply the output of the mappings. Otherwise, the concepts are not metaphorical, but have metaphorical origins (i.e., lakoff and johnson are doing linguistic archeology, like I always say).Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08417970139690159046noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1123462578162044572005-08-07T19:56:00.000-05:002005-08-07T19:56:00.000-05:00I think that Keysar et al. missed one of the big p...I think that Keysar et al. missed one of the big points about conceptual mappings such that one might question the relevancy of their results or opt to do a futher study about this. The point that they seem to have missed is that the mappings crucially preserve patterns of inference. So that while it is probably not the case that any mention of the metaphor triggers the mapping (when more literal reasoning suffices for the task at hand), I would like to see results in this kind of study when the target sentence is based on a pattern of inference that is to be imported from the target domain to the source domain. Keyser et al do not do this for some reason. Actually, they do this only in the case of their novel metaphors, which, curiously, is the case in which the mappings appear to be used.<BR/><BR/>I would be interested in other's thoughts on the matter.<BR/><BR/>-AdamAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1115053154376636912005-05-02T11:59:00.000-05:002005-05-02T11:59:00.000-05:00Gibbs' work deals specifically with figurative lan...Gibbs' work deals specifically with figurative language, as does much of the work on political metaphor, but Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, and the rest have pretty much described all speech as ultimately figurative. <BR/><BR/>Glucksberg is a case in point. While he often looks at overtly figurative language, his conclusions are generalized to all speech and thought.Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08417970139690159046noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1115051543891793282005-05-02T11:32:00.000-05:002005-05-02T11:32:00.000-05:00Actually, most of the research on conceptual metap...Actually, most of the research on conceptual metaphor deals specifically with understanding figurative language. There isn't so much examining how conceptual metaphors play into abstract thought. You should also check out Sam Glucksberg, who has written a lot on the subject.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1100143166074208412004-11-10T21:19:00.000-06:002004-11-10T21:19:00.000-06:00I just read it, and it does come out a little conf...I just read it, and it does come out a little confusing. What I mean is that outside of cognitive linguistics, the conceptual metaphor theory isn't taken very seriously. It's spurred some research on spatial metaphors for time, and gets cited now and then by some knowledge representation people, but in 24 years, it's led to very little published research, and given these findings and others, it probably never will lead to much. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fmixingmemory.blogspot.com" TITLE="scarymoonie at aol dot com">Chris</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8182098.post-1100120543788057572004-11-10T15:02:00.000-06:002004-11-10T15:02:00.000-06:00I think you're right that this is a fairly strong ...I think you're right that this is a fairly strong argument against Lakoff's position; the McGlone experiment as you characterized it seems sufficiently suggestive in its own right that with supplementary evidence like that of Keysar et al. I don't see how one could continue to accept the conceptual metaphor view.<br /><br />When you say "outside of the cognitive linguistics circle," did you mean "within the cognitive linguistics circle" or am I misunderstanding what you mean by 'cognitive linguistics'? For some reason that sentence keeps reading like the opposite of what I presume you are trying to say. <br /><br /><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://www.blogger.com/r?http%3A%2F%2Fbranemrys.blogspot.com%2F" TITLE="branem2 at branemrys dot org">Brandon</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com